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NOTES
JURISDICTION-ATOMIC ENERGY-Federal Pre-emption
and State Regulation of Radioactive Air Pollution: Who
Is the Master of the Atomic Genie?
Pending litigation between the Minnesota Pollution Control
Agency and Northern States Power Company presents a potential
federal-state conflict over the right of a state to impose upon operators of nuclear power plants more exacting pollution control standards than those required by regulations of the Atomic Energy
Commission (AEC).1 The AEC issued Northern States Power Company a permit to construct a nuclear power generating plant in
Monticello, Minnesota.2 The regulations under which that permit
was issued place a ceiling on the amount of radioactive effluents
which can be discharged into the air during the course of the plant's
operations.3 But under the regulations of the Minnesota Pollution
Control Agency, before the power company could begin operation of
the plant, it was required to obtain a permit from that agency. 4 The
permit that it obtained from the state agency restricted the discharge
of radioactive effluents from the plant to approximately two per
cent of the levels allowed under the AEC standards. 5 Northern
States Power Company complained that the state standards made
economical operation of the plant impossible. The company has filed
suit in federal district court, 6 asserting that the State of Minnesota
is precluded from regulating radioactive pollution from atomic
power plants because Congress has given the AEC exclusive authority to regulate radiation hazards. 7
Although conflict between federal and state regulation of radiation hazards has existed for several years, 8 the suit in the federal
1. Clemons, Pollution: Are Nuclear Reactors Safe?, Wall. St. J., Aug. 28, 1969, at
6, col. 4.
2. 2 CCH ATOMIC ENERGY L. REP. 1[ 11,264 (1967).
3. See 10 C.F.R. pt. 20 (1969).
4. The Minnesota Pollution Control Agency promulgated these regulations under
authority of MINN. STAT. ANN. § 116 (1964) on the theory that radioactive pollution of
the air is merely one form of air contamination within its regulatory control. Telephone Interview with Robert Johnson, Counsel to the Minnesota Pollution Control
Agency, May I, 1970.
5. Kenworthy, Who Should Police the Polluters?, N.Y. Times, Feb. 1, 1970, § E,
at 2, col. 4.
6. Northern States Power Co. v. Minnesota, Civ. No. 3-69-185 (D. Minn., filed Aug.
26, 1969).
7. Kenworthy, supra note 5.
8. For example, in March 1961, the Pennsylvania Department of Health and Safety
ordered a company to reduce the concentration of low-level radioactive wastes which
the company was discharging into a river to 50% of the level permitted under its AEC
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district court in Minnesota presents the first opportunity for an adjudication of the question whether the AEC is the exclusive regulator of air pollution from atomic power operations. The stringent
state regulations which have created the federal-state conflict in the
Minnesota case grew out of the concern of environmentalists that
AEC standards regulating radioactive discharges from nuclear production and utilization facilities fail to afford adequate protection.9
Environmentalists have persuaded several state legislatures to enact
pollution standards which include provisions regulating radioactive
pollutants discharged by atomic activities conducted within their
states. 10 As concern for the environment grows, and as the atomic
energy industry expands,11 resolution of the question whether the
state or the federal government shall regulate pollution caused by
that industry becomes increasingly important.

I.

THE FRAMEWORK FOR JUDICIAL .ANALYSIS
OF THE PRE-EMPTION QUESTION

There can be no doubt that Congress possesses the constitutional
authority to enact the basic statutory framework for the regulation
of atomic energy; 12 nor is there any doubt that Congress could have
license. Litigation was avoided, however, because the company decided to comply with
the state order. Estep &: Adelman, State Control of Radiation: An Intergovernmental
Relations Problem, 60 MICH. L. R.Ev. 41, 43 (1961). In 1962, Consolidated Edison Company of New York withdrew an application to build a nuclear reactor in New York
City, when it was faced with a vote by the city council on a bill to prohibit construction of nuclear reactors within the city limits. Helman, Preemption: Approaching
Federal-State Conflict over Licensing Nuclear Power Plants, 51 MARQ. L. R.Ev. 43, 44
(1967). In Doswell v. City of Long Beach, l CCH ATOMIC ENERGY L. REP. ,f 4045 (Cal.
Super. March 21, 1960), the superior court held that the city would not revoke plaintiff's permit to engage in the business of radioactive-waste disposal simply because the
city health department had withdrawn its approval. In a sweeping statement, the court
concluded that the Atomic Energy Act [42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-296 (1964)] covered the entire
field of atomic-energy legislation, CCH ATOMIC ENERGY L. REP. ,f 4045, at 9113.

9. Clemons, supra note I. See also Wicker, In the Nation: Taking on a Nuclear
Giant, N.Y. Times, March I, 1970, at 17, col. 4.
10. CAL. HEALTH &: SAFETY CODE §§ 25600-10 (West 1967). See also ARIZ. R.Ev. STAT.
ANN. §§ 36-771 to -790 (Supp. 1969); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 17-501 to -530 (Supp. 1969)
(water pollution).
11. At the present time, less than 1% of the nation's electrical energy is produced
by nuclear installations. Dy 1980, however, nuclear power will generate approximately
25% of the country's electrical energy. Tape, Environmental Aspects of Operation of
Central Power Plants 3 (remarks at dinner meeting of the Washington Section of the
American Nuclear Society, Dec. 11, 1968).
12. In enacting the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-296 (1964), Congress relied upon its constitutionally granted powers of defense, proprietorship, and
commerce to justify its regulation of radiation hazards. Several writers have analyzed
the permissibility of that reliance and have concluded that the three named powers
provide a sufficient constitutional basis for the regulatory scheme promulgated by the
AEC. That conclusion appears to be sound. See, e.g., Estep &: Adelman, State Control
of Radiation: An Intergovernmental Relations Problem, 60 MICH. L. R.Ev. 41, 44-50
(1961).
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pre-empted the field had it so chosen. In United States v. Darby,13
the United States Supreme Court held that when a court is faced
with a pre-emption issue involving a power which the Constitution
has del~gated to Congress, the question to be answered is not
whether Congress can pre-empt state legislation, but rather, whether
Congress has pre-empted it. 14 A review of the cases discussing the
pre-emption of state law by federal legislation which deals with the
same subject matter reveals that in formulating tests for resolving
the issue, the Supreme Court has used a variety of expressions.ii:;
Despite the diversity of expressions, however, it is clear that the
Court uses the same basic analytical approach in all cases involving
the question of pre-emption. Under this approach, the Court first
examines the provisions of the respective federal and state laws to
determine whether they conflict to such an extent that both laws
cannot be enforced "without impairing federal superintendence of
the field." 16 If no such conflict exists, the Court then determines
whether a finding of pre-emption is required either because the
subject matter of the legislation involves dominant national interests
which demand uniform regulation or because Congress has manifested an intent to preclude concurrent state legislation. 17
The cases reveal that the Court's willingness to tolerate concurrent state legislation in any particular case depends largely upon the
subject matter involved. For example, when the federal legislation
deals with economic matters, 18 individual rights and freedoms, 10 or
a field in which the national interest is clearly dominant,20 conflicting state legislation is usually held invalid if it "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purpose and
objectives of Congress."21 Moreover, in such cases, the Court tends
13. 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
14. 312 U.S. at 124.
15. See, e.g., Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941):
This Court, in considering the validity of state laws in the light of treaties or
federal laws ... has made use of the following expressions: conflicting; contrary
to; occupying the field; repugnance; irreconcilability; inconsistency; violation;
curtailment; and interference. But none of these expressions provides an infallible
constitutional test or . . . yardstick. In the final analysis, there can be no one
crystal, distinctly marked formula.
16. Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142 (1963).
17. Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 143 (1963).
18. See, e.g., Campbell v. Hussey, 368 U.S. 297 (1967).
19. Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52
(1941).
20. See, e.g., San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959) (labor
relations); Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956) (seditious activities against the
national government); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941) (immigration and
naturalization).
21. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67-68 (1941); cf. Savage v. Jones, 225 U.S. 501,
533 (1912).
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to base its finding of pre-emption on relatively slender evidence of
congressional intent.22 The application of these standards results in
the invalidation of any state law that is inconsistent with the general
scheme of the federal legislation. Similarly, when the subject matter
of the legislation demands national uniformity of regulation, state
law is usually pre-empted on the ground that federal legislation has
completely occupied the field. 23
On the other hand, in cases in which the state law that allegedly
has been displaced by federal legislation involves an area of longrecognized state interests-particularly public health and safetythe Court has been more tolerant of concurrent state legislation.24
In such cases, the Court has generally required a repugnance or an
actual conflict between the substantive provisions of the respective
federal and state laws before it has concluded that the state law had
been pre-empted. 25 Moreover, in such cases, the Court has required
more persuasive evidence of congressional intent to preclude state
legislation26 than it has in cases in which long-standing state interests
have not been present. Finally, when strong state interests have been
present, the Court has seemed relatively indulgent of state regulation
and it has frequently upheld such state laws, particularly if those
laws have operated mainly to fill the gaps in federal legislation.27
As an initial matter, then, it must be determined which of the
22. Campbell v. Hussey, 368 U.S. 297, 302 (1961) Gustice Black, dissenting). See
also Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947): "[T]he act of Congress
may 'touch a field in which the federal interest is so dominant that the federal system
[must] be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject.' "
23. Although the requirement of uniformity is a sufficient independent constitutional
basis for such a decision [Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 298 (1851)],
the Court occasionally prefers to decide these cases on the ground of federal preemption. See, e.g., Napier v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 272 U.S. 605 (1926); Pennsylvania
R.R. v. Public Serv. Commn., 250 U.S. 566 (1919). See generally Note, Pre-emption as a
Preferential Ground-A New Canon of Construction, 12 STAN. L. REv. 208 (1959).
24. See, e.g., Head v. New Mexico Bd. of Examiners, 374 U.S. 424 (1963); Florida
Lime &: Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132 (1963). In the latter case, for
example, the Court noted: "Vvhile it is conceded that the California statute is not a
health measure, neither logic nor precedent invites any distinction between state
regulation designed to keep unhealthful or unsafe commodities off the grocer's shelves
and those designed to prevent deception of consumers.'' 373 U.S. at 146. See also
Cloverleaf Butter Co. v. Patterson, 315 U.S. 148 (1942) (Chief Justice Stone, dissenting);
Kelly v. Washington, 302 U.S. 1 (1937); note 27 infra.
25. Kelly v. Washington, 302 U.S. 1 (1937), illustrates the test used in such cases:
"The principle is thoroughly established that the exercise by the state of its police
powers, which would be valid if not superceded by federal action, is superceded only
where the repugnance or conflict is so 'direct and positive' that the two acts cannot
be reconciled or consistently stand together." 302 U.S. at IO.
26. See, e.g., Head v. New Mexico Bd. of Examiners, 374 U.S. 424, 432 (1963);
Florida Lime&: Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 146 (1963).
27. See, e.g., Huron Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960); Welch v.
New Hampshire, 306 U.S. 72 (1939); Kelly v. Washington, 302 U.S. 1 (1937); Mintz v.
Baldwin, 289 U.S. 87 (1933); Savage v. Jones, 225 U.S. 507 (1911).
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foregoing categories of pre-emption cases the controversies involving
the regulation of radioactive air pollution most closely resemble. It
can be argued with some force that such disputes fall within that
category of cases in which there are dominant national interests or
a need for uniform national regulation. That argument is supported
by the fact that the federal government has exercised broad authority over atomic energy since the early development of the field by
governmental scientists working on the Manhattan Engineering
Project.28 Moreover, atomic energy has been the subject of extensive
federal legislation-the Atomic Energy Act29-and is regulated by a
special federal agency-the AEC.3° Furthermore, it can be argued
that the development of nuclear power is a vital national interest
which is more adequately served through federal, rather than state,
regulation. But the state regulation which is the subject of controversies such as that in Minnesota is not concerned with atomic
power as such. Rather, the state regulation is directed toward air
pollution from atomic power facilities; pollution control, unlike
atomic-energy development, is an area of long-standing state interest
and responsibility. That responsibility has been recognized both by
the Supreme Court31 and by Congress.32 The disputes in question
thus fall between the two lines of pre-emption cases, and it is at
least arguable that the national interest in promoting the development of atomic energy is not dominant when it is compared with
the interests which the states have in protecting the health and
safety of their citizens through preventing radioactive pollution of
the local environment. If a court rejects that argument, however, it
will have little difficulty in deciding that state regulation is preempted either on the ground that such regulation conflicts with the
objectives of the federal regulatory scheme-to protect the public
health without restraining industrial development by imposing unnecessarily strict safety standards33-or on the ground that federal
legislation was intended to occupy the field fully. 34 Moreover, even
if a court finds that the national interests are not dominant, it is
28. Esgain, State Authority and Responsibility in the Atomic Energy Field, 1962
DUKE L.J. 163, 163-65.
29. 42 u.s.c. §§ 2011-296 (1964).
30. 42 u.s.c. § 2031 (1964).
31. Huron Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960).
32. Air Quality Control Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1857(a)(3) (Supp. IV, 1965-1968); cf. Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 466(b) (Supp. IV, 1965-1968).
33. 42 U.S.C. § 2013 (1964); AEC, Criteria for Guidance of States and the AEC in
the Discontinuance of AEC Regulatory Authority over By-Product, Source, and Special
Nuclear Materials in Quantities Not Sufficient To Form a Critical Mass and the Assumption Thereof by States Through Agreement, Criterion One, in 4 CCH ATOMIC
ENERGY L. REP. 11 16,537 (1967).
34. See notes 20, 23 supra and accompanying text.
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still not clear that state regulation can be upheld under the more
indulgent standards expressed in the second category of cases.35
In pursuing this inquiry, the court must determine whether the
state, by enacting exacting standards relating to radioactive pollution of the air, is supplementing or frustrating the provisions and
purposes of the Atomic Energy Act. The fact that the state regulations are designed to eliminate the same environmental evil to
which federal regulations are directed is not sufficient for a finding
of pre-emption, for the Supreme Court has held that concurrence of
regulation is not by itself a sufficient ground for declaring that a
state standard has been pre-empted.36 Indeed, the Court has indicated in Florida Lime and Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul31 that
even state regulations which are more stringent than federal regulations may supplement federal legislation without conflicting ·with
it. That case involved a California law which barred immature
avocados from the California markets. The California statute defined
immature avocados as those having an oil content of less than eight
per cent while the federal marketing standards defined maturity on
the basis of size, weight, and picking date.38 Florida Lime and Avocado Growers, Inc., asserted that the existence of the federal standards precluded the enforcement of the California law, which operated to exclude from the California markets approximately six
per cent of the avocados which met the federal standard. In upholding the California regulation, the Court utilized the following
standard for determining whether the federal and state laws were in
direct conflict:
A holding of federal exclusion of state law is inescapable and requires no inquiry into congressional design where compliance with
both federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility for one
engaged in interstate commerce.39

The Court then recited the district court's finding that Florida
avocados were capable of complying with the most exacting Cali35. See text accompanying notes 24-27 supra.
36. California v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725, 730 (1949) (upholding the validity of a state
statute which prohibited the same activity prohibited under the Federal Motor Carrier
Act). It may be argued that the Court retreated from its position in Zook when it
decided Campbell v. Hussey, 368 U.S. 297, 301 (1961) (holding that the Tobacco
Inspection Act fully occupied the field of tobacco inspection and classification). In
Campbell, however, the Court found a congressional intent to pre-empt concurrent
state regulation before it declared that supplemental state regulation was as susceptible to this pre-emption as was state regulation which conflicts with the federal
scheme. 368 U.S. at 302.
37. 373 U.S. 132 (1963).
38. 373 U.S. at 139.
39. 373 U.S. at 142-43 (emphasis added).
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fornia maturity test and that they had done so in the past, and it
concluded that there was therefore no direct conflict.40
However, the Court's test in Lime and Avocado Growers should
not be relied upon too heavily. If taken literally, that test would
mean that a direct conflict between state and federal standards
would never exist so long as compliance with the most exacting regulation, whether federal or state, would necessarily include compliance with the less exacting regulation. So viewed, the test seems
overly broad. More realistically, the test should be viewed simply as
an illustration that in cases involving state health and safety measures, the Court requires a high degree of conflict between state and
federal laws before it will declare that state law has been pre-empted
by federal legislation. Moreover, the case clearly does suggest that if
the state's health and safety standards are more exacting than those
in federal regulations, the Court may be more willing to tolerate
concurrent state regulation than it is when the state standards are
more permissive than the federal standards.41
The foregoing discussion of the conflicts tests which have been
articulated by the Supreme Court suggests that there is no direct
conflict between state and federal regulations concerning air pollution from atomic sources. Consequently, resolution of the preemption question must turn upon an examination of congressional
intent. At one time the Court seemed to indicate that an intent to
pre-empt was to be presumed from the mere enactment of federal
legislation upon a subject.42 Subsequent decisions, however, indicate
that the Court no longer adheres to this position. In California v.
Zook,43 the Court held that the mere coincidence of regulation, without evidence of a congressional intent to exclude the state regulation, is only one factor to be considered in an inquiry into.congressional intent. 44 In determining such intent, the Court seems to rely
both upon direct evidence and upon inferences drawn from its inquiries into the historical background and legislative history of the
particular federal statute in question. In addition, the Court seeks
40. 373 U.S. at 143.
41. The four dissenting justices in Lime and Avocado Growers interpreted the
majority opinion to stand for this proposition. After concluding that federal and state
standards did not conflict, the Court analyzed the provisions of the Act, their legislative history, and their operation, and determined that Congress did not manifest an
unambiguous intent to preclude state regulation.
42. See Erie R.R. v. New York, 233 U.S. 671 (1914). In that case, a New York law
prescribing an eight-hour work day for railroad telegraph operators was held to be
pre-empted by a federal statute prescribing a nine-hour work period for nighttime
operators and a thirteen-hour work period for daytime operators.
43. 336 U.S. 725 (1949).
44. 336 U.S. at 730.
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to determine legislative intent through an examination of the statute
itself and of its administration by the designated federal agency. 45
Since there is apparently no direct conflict between the state and
federal regulations in the present controversy, judicial determination
of congressional intent is necessary. The discussion which follows
seeks to examine the legislative history and implementation of the
1954 Atomic Energy Act, 46 in order to determine whether, under the
foregoing approach, a court is likely to find that there was a congressional intent sufficient to preclude state legislation concerning pollution from atomic power facilities.

II.

THE LEGISLATIVE INTENT BEHIND THE ATOMIC ENERGY ACT

The purpose of the 1954 Atomic Energy Act was to encourage
the private development and utilization of atomic energy. 47 As
private industries began to operate nuclear facilities, legislatures of
states in which such facilities were operated became concerned about
increased radiation hazards, and they enacted laws to regulate atomic
activities conducted within their states under AEC licenses. 48 Because the 1954 Act contained no express statement concerning
pre-emption, the need for a clarification of state and federal responsibilities in the regulation of the nuclear industry became increasingly
evident. In 1959 Congress sought to provide that clarification by
enacting section 274 of the 1959 amendments to the Act. 49
Section 274(b) of those amendments authorized the AEC to enter
into a "turnover" agreement with the governor of any state for the
discontinuance of AEC regulation of certain specified materials: (I)
by-product materials, (2) source materials, and (3) special nuclear
materials in quantities not sufficient to form a critical mass. 50 But
45. Head v. New Mexico Bd. of Examiners, 374 U.S. 424, 432 (1963).
46. 42 u.s.c. §§ 2011-296 (1964).
47. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011, 2013(d) (1964).
48. See generally E. STASON, s. EsTEP, & W. PIERCE, ATOMS AND THE LAw 952-1001
(1959).
49. 42 U.S.C. § 2021 (1964). See Estep & Adelman, supra note 12, at 58-60.
50. 42 U.S.C. § 2021(b) (1964). Twenty-two states have entered into turnover agreements with the AEC: Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Florida,
Georgia, Idaho, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, Nebraska, New Hampshire,
New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oregon, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas,
and Washington. Although New York has entered into a turnover agreement with the
AEC, it has not conceded exclusive AEC jurisdiction. Memorandum of Understanding
art. 5, in 4 CCH ATOMIC ENERGY L. REP. ,i 16,563 (1967). States which have entered
into turnover agreements with the AEC exercise exclusive control over the specified
materials; but before entering into an agreement authorized by § 274(b), the AEC
must find that the state regulatory program is compatible with the federal program
and is adequate to protect public health and safety. 42 U.S.C. § 202l(d)(2) (1964). To
guide the states in formulating their regulatory programs, the AEC has published
criteria to be used in evaluating these programs. These criteria require that federal
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section 274(b) is limited in scope to these materials and provides for
the relinquishment of AEC authority only in these areas. More relevant to the issue of air pollution from atomic facilities is section
274(c):
No agreement entered into pursuant to subsection (b) shall provide
for discontinuance of any authority and the Commission shall retain
authority and responsibility with respect to regulation of(1) the construction and operation of any production facility. 51

According to interpretations by the AEC, the agency's responsibilities under this subsection include the control of radioactive discharges into the air. 52
Admittedly, one could argue that these two sections, read together, indicate a congressional design to delegate to the AEC the
power of exclusive control of radiation hazards, although the AEC
could, if it so chose, delegate some of that power to the states. In
light of the historical background of the amendment, this interpretation of congressional purpose appears to be reasonable. On the
other hand, it can be argued that section 274(c) precludes the AEC
merely from entering into those agreements with the states under
which the states would have exclusive responsibility for regulating
radioactive pollution of the air, and that the section does not on its
face preclude stringent state standards which are designed to supplement, rather than to replace, minimum federal standards established
by the AEC.53 Because an intent to preclude state regulation of poland state standards for radiation protection be uniform. AEC, Criteria for Guidance
of States and the AEC in the Discontinuance of AEC Regulatory Authority over ByProduct Source and Special Nuclear Materials in Quantities Not Sufficient To Form a
Critical Mass and the Assumption Thereof by States Through Agreement, Criterion 3,
in 4 CCH ATOMIC ENERGY L. REP. ,i 16,537 (1967).
51. 42 U.S.C. § 202l(c)(l) (1964).
52. Control of radioactive effiuents is considered an integral part of the design,
construction, and operation of nuclear-production facilities. See Hearings on FederalState Relations Before the Joint Comm. on Atomic Energy, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 306
(1959) [testimony of Robert Lowenstein, Office of the General Counsel, AEC, explaining § 274(c)] [hereinafter 1959 Hearings].
53. Lime and Avocado Growers indicates that the Court is unlikely to hold state
regulation pre-empted when state standards merely supplement federal standards. St:e
text accompanying notes 37-41 supra. In its analysis of congressional intent, the Court,
in Lime and Avocado Growers, emphasized that the Agricultural Adjustment Act
authorized the Secretary to set minimum standards. The dissent dismissed the majority's reliance upon this language in the federal law:
It is a commonplace that when the appropriate federal regulating agency adopts
minimum standards which on balance satisfy the needs of the subject matter
without a disproportionate burden on the regulatees, the balance struck is not
to be upset by the imposition of higher local standards. • • • And when the
cumulative operation of more strict local law is to be continued • • • Congress
has so provided in express terms.
373 U.S. at 171 (emphasis added). Lime and Avocado Growers graphically illustrates
that different pre-emption standards are applied by the Court according to the
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lution in this area is not clearly evident in the statutory language,
an analysis of the legislative history of section 274(c) is necessary in
order to glean additional indications of congressional intent.
During the hearings on the amendment held by the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, the lack of an explicit delineation of
federal and state responsibilities regarding the operation of nuclear
reactors was discussed. In fact, the same Minnesota regulations54 that
are the subject of the current controversy between that state and the
AEC led Mr. Toll, counsel to the committee, to suggest the need for
further clarification:
Mr. Toll. . .. [O]n the question of reactors does this bill go far
enough? Should there be a statement that these activities are expressly preemptive to the federal government?
Mr. Lowenstein. [Office of the General Counsel, AEC] Under this bill
which gives explicit reference to the interest of the Federal and State
Governments, we think it would be fairly apparent, as many of us
now believe under the existing Atomic Energy Act, that there has
been an area of preemption. We considered the desirability of writing the kind of provision you suggested, Mr. Toll, and we decided
against it, primarily for the reason that it is practically impossible to
try to define, taking into account all of the various gray areas and
special circumstances that might arise, where these areas of preemption begin and end.
Mr. Toll. Does this bill do anything to clarify the situation as to
the Minnesota regulations ... ? Minnesota has no indication from
the Federal Government as to whether or not the State of Minnesota
has legal authority to license reactors.

Mr. Lowenstein. In this bill, we are not trying to deal with any
specific situation.
Mr. Toll. Minnesota is just an example of the first State that has
attempted to license reactors. Should this bill attempt to spell out
whether or not they are encouraged or whether they have legal
authority to do this?
Mr. Lowenstein. I think this is a suggestion that is certainly worth
giving consideration to. The problem, I think, that you run into is
that when you begin to specify one thing such as licensing, then
you create questions and perhaps leave inferences as to what the
State's authority might be in other details. 55
Mr. Toll then suggested that the Act should be reworded in order
various characterizations of the interests involved; the majority viewed the case as
involving a health and safety measure, whereas the dissent looked upon the California
statute as an economic measure.
54. See note 2 supra.
55. 1959 Hearings 307.
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to make explicit Congress' intent to pre-empt state control of nuclear reactors; but Mr. Lowenstein, expressing the AEC position,
stated a preference for leaving the question to the courts:
Mr. Lowenstein. We thought that this act, without saying in so many
words did make clear that there was preemption here, but we have
tried to avoid defining the precise extent of that preemption, feeling
that it is better to leave these kinds of detailed questions perhaps up
to the courts later to be resolved. 56
Representative Durham voiced some objection to the AEC position:
Representative Durham. I don't agree in writing an act like that.
I think it should be clearly defined what is our field and what is
their field.
Mr. Lowenstein. I think this does do that, Mr. Durham.
Representative Durham. I think so, too. If they want to set up a
licensing system, they can do it. The courts will decide it, then, not
us. I think the law should be as clear as possible to avoid litigation.
I am not a lawyer, but I wonder if that is not a pretty clear statement of what we intended to do, and what we are writing into the
act. 57
Some additional suggestion of the congressional intent with respect to pre-emption may be seen in the Senate report which accompanied the bill. That report contained two statements referring
to the exclusive authority of the AEC. One statement, found in the
Comments by the Joint Committee, is a specific reference to section
274(b) and thus may not be applicable to section 274(c), which is
the provision that is more relevant to control of radioactive air pollution. 58 The other statement is more general and is included in
the Committee's analysis of subsection (k), which provides: "Nothing
in this section shall be construed to affect the authority of a state
or local agency to regulate activities for purposes other than protection against radiation hazards." 59 The Committee's statement explained that provision as follows:
This subsection [(k)] is intended to make it clear that the bill does not
impair the state authority to regulate activities of AEC licensees for
manifold health, safety, and economic purposes other than radiation
protection. As indicated elsewhere, the Commission has exclusive
authority to regulate for protection against radiation hazards until
56.
57.
mittee
58.
59.

Id.
Id. at 307-08. Representative Carl T. Durham was Chairman of the Joint Comon Atomic Energy.
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 2879 (1959).
42 U.S.C. § 202I(k) (1964).
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such time as the state enters into an agreement with the Commission
to assume such responsibility.6°
Since the statute's only reference to "agreements" is that contained
in section 274(b), it appears that the "agreements" to which the committee refers must be those contemplated by subsection (b). And because subsection (b) refers to agreements only with respect to source,
by-product, and special nuclear materials, it is at least arguable that
subsection (k.)'s apparent preclusion of state regulation refers only to
regulation of those specific areas and does not preclude state regulation of radioactive air pollution. 61
The legislative history of section 274(c) does reveal that Congress
intended to pre-empt state regulation of nuclear reactors, but the
precise extent of that intended pre-emption is not certain. In fact,
the AEC successfully argued against rewording the statute to provide
that the Commission would have exclusive authority to regulate
nuclear reactors; the AEC, in this particular instance, preferred the
flexibility afforded by a less precise delineation of the bounds of
federal pre-emption.62 Admittedly, some members of the Committee
believed that section 274(c) in its original form, which was subsequently enacted into law with the passage of the amendments, was
sufficient to indicate a congressional intent to pre-empt all state
regulation of nuclear reactors. But the actual wording of the provision may afford the court some flexibility in interpreting it. It would
arguably not be inconsistent with federal regulation of the construction and operation of reactors for a state to determine, within the
limits of technological feasibility, what amount of discharge of
atomic effluents is tolerable, and to refuse to permit the operation
of a nuclear reactor within its borders unless that standard is met.
The specific design and operational aspects of the atomic power installation would be left to the AEC.
Of course, after analyzing the provisions of the statute, their
legislative history, and the historical background of the amendments
to the act, a court could reasonably conclude that Congress intended
60. U.S. CODE CONG. &: AD. NEWS, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 2882-83 (1959).
61. That contention finds support in the legislative history of subsection (k). As that
subsection was originally drafted, its preclusion of state regulation was explicitly
directed to those categories contained in § 274(b):
It is the intention of this Act that State laws and regulations conceming the
control of radiation hazards from by-product, source, and special nuclear materials
shall not be applicable except pursuant to an agreement entered into with the
Commission pursuant to subsection (b): Provided, however, that States may adopt
registration requirements for such materials and may inspect the use of such
materials within States to assure compliance with the Commission's regulations.
1959 Hearings 489.
62. See testimony of Mr. Robert Lowenstein in text accompanying notes 55-57
supra.
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federal legislation fully to occupy the field of radiation-hazard regulation, and that concurrent state regulation is therefore precluded.
But the legislative history does not clearly mandate that conclusion.
Indeed, there is some indication of an express intent to leave the
courts substantial room for interpretation. 63 Interpretative factors in
judicial resolution of questions of federal pre-emption are malleable
and may sometimes be shaped by the policies surrounding a particular issue.64 Thus it seems that if a court can be persuaded that the
local interests in protecting the environment from unnecessary radioactive pollution not only are not subordinate to, but are significantly greater than, the federal interest in promoting the development of economical nuclear power, then the court might conclude
that Congress has not manifested an unambiguous intent to displace
state regulation of radioactive pollution of the air. 65

III.

POLICY CONSIDERATIONS

A description of the AEC's procedure for licensing nuclear reactors under the Atomic Energy Act provides valuable insights
necessary to a comprehension of the policy considerations which
could bear upon judicial resolution of the pre-emption question.
The AEC's licensing procedure may be broadly analyzed as a twostep process. 66 The prospective licensee first files with the AEC an
application for an operating license. 67 The application must contain
detailed information sufficient to enable the AEC's regulatory staff
to determine whether the applicant has made adequate provisions
for the protection of public health and safety. 68 The Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) 69 makes a similar but independent review of the safety features of the reactor. The regula63. See testimony of l\:Ir. Robert Lowenstein in text accompanying note 57 supra.
64. See generally text accompanying notes 16-27 supra.
65. Compare opinion of the Court in California v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725 (1941), with
dissenting opinion of Justice Burton, 336 U.S. at 741.
66. See generally Green, Safety Determinations in Nuclear Power Licensing: A
Critical View, 43 NOTRE DAME I.Aw. 633, 635-43 (1968).
67. The AEC has a statutory duty to give prompt notice of the filing of a license
application to the state in which the proposed activities will be conducted. 42 U.S.C.
§ 2021(1) (1964). The AEC rules of practice require that copies of the application be
sent to the chief executive officer of the state and to the appropriate local subdivision.
10 C.F.R. § 2.lOl(b) (1969).
68. 10 C.F.R. § 50.34(a) (1969).
69. The ACRS, an advisory committee of scientists and engineers, is a statutory
creation of Congress [42 U.S.C. § 2039 (1969)] and provides an independent evaluation
of the safety aspects of the AEC license proceedings. Members of the committee are not
employees of the AEC, but serve as independent consultants, and are selected by the
AEC from nominations made by the existing committee and the Director of Regulation. Hearings on Environmental Effects of Producing Electric Power Before the Joint
Comm. on Atomic Energy, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 110 (1969) (testimony of Commissioner
Ranc:!y, AEC) [hereinafter 1969 Hearings].
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tory staff and the ACRS both write reports, which are submitted to
the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board.70 The Board then holds
a hearing to determine whether a provisional construction permit
will be issued.71 In actual practice, the regulatory staff and the ACRS
do not issue their reports until the applicant has complied with their
safety requirements. 72 Thus the proceedings are usually uncontested and pro forma, and consist mostly of introducing testimony in
support of the reports of the regulatory staff and the ACRS. States
do have the opportunity to intervene,73 however, and may introduce
testimony and evidence to contest the safety determinations of the
regulatory staff and the ACRS.74 Upon completion of construction
in accordance with the application, the applicant then, as the second
stage in the licensing procedure, amends his application by including
a final safety analysis. If the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board
then finds that the operation of the facility will not endanger public
health and safety, an operating permit is issued.75
The AEC licensing procedure outlined above is characterized
by a series of complex questions which demand that highly trained
scientists, technicians, and engineers administer the procedure. For
this reason, it is clear that a complete licensing program is beyond
the financial capability of most state governments. The federal
government, because of its superior financial resources, is more
likely to attract qualified personnel than are the states. Accordingly,
70. The ACRS report becomes part of the record of the application and a copy is
sent to the appropriate state official. IO C.F.R. § 2.102(c) (1969).
71. The AEC regulations were amended in 1966 to permit the construction of the
reactor to proceed simultaneously with research and development of the safety features.
10 C.F.R. § 50.35 (1969). The applicant must submit the proposed design for the
facility, identify the safety features or components requiring further research, and
specify that a research and development program will be conducted in order to resolve
any safety questions before the latest completion date designated in the application.
Upon a finding that the proposed facility can operate without undue risk to the
public, a provisional construction permit will be issued. 10 C.F.R. § 2.l04(b)(l) (1969).
72. Green, supra note 66, at 642.
73. 42 U.S.C. § 202l(i) (1964). Although Minnesota officials did not intervene in the
proceeding, they did make a limited appearance, without taking a position on the
issue, in order to introduce evidence, interrogate witnesses, and advise the Commission
as provided for in 10 C.F.R. § 2.715 (1969). 2 CCH ATOMIC ENERGY L. REP. 1J 11,264
(1967).
74. It has been argued that this procedure is not satisfactory, because the inter•
venor bas the burden of proving the inadequacy of the safety precautions provided in
the application. See Green, supra note 66, at 655.
75. 10 C.F.R. § 50.35(e) (1969); 42 U.S.C. § 2133 (1964) provides that no license may
be issued when the public health and safety would thereby be jeopardized. Although
an operating license may be granted without a hearing, the Commission is required to
give thirty-days notice of its intention to do so, and must bold a hearing if one is
requested by a party whose interests will be affected by the issuance of the license.
42 U.S.C. § 2239(a) (1964). A public bearing on the application of Northern States
Power Company for an operating license was scheduled for April 28, 1970. Report
Letter No. 769, 4 CCH ATOMIC ENERGY I.Aw REP. (March 13, 1970).
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advocates of federal control argue that the states cannot act effectively in this area. 76 This argument, however, is not conclusive.
States do recognize the limitations on their ability to administer a
comprehensive program, and consequently they tend to concentrate
their efforts on specific problem areas. 77 By concentrating their resources on the specific area of air pollution, for example, the states
may well be able to attract radiological-health experts who are as
qualified in that particular area as are those employed by the federal
government. 78 Moreover, many such persons can be found on the
campuses of state universities and colleges and may therefore be
available to the states as consultants.79
A further argument advanced in favor of exclusive federal control is the contention of the nuclear-energy industry that it finds
greater reassurance in the AEC's comprehensive program than in
disjointed state schemes, because the federal regulator has an appreciation of the over-all problems associated with the regulation of
the industry. 80 Although this argument has a certain persuasiveness,
it also has weaknesses. It may be questioned, first of all, whether it
is desirable to preclude state regulation simply because the industry
would prefer to be regulated only by the federal agency with which
it is familiar. The tendency of regulatory agencies to be "captured"
76. See, e.g., Helman, Preemption: Approaching Federal-State Conflict over Licensing Nuclear Power Plants, 51 MARQ. L. REv. 43, 63-66 (1967).
77. Id.
78. Indeed, the standards contained in the Minnesota Pollution Control Agency
permit were recommended by Dr. Ernest C. Tsivoglou, Professor of Sanitary Engineering at the Georgia Institute of Technology and former head of radiological water
pollution control for the United States Public Health Service, who is serving as a
consultant to the Pollution Control Agency. Clemons, supra note I.
79. Dr. G. Hoyt Whipple, Professor of Radiological Health, School of Public
Health, University of Michigan, stated in an interview that, in his opinion, a sufficient number of radiological-health experts would be available to furnish the required personnel to the states if state regulation is upheld. Faculty members of state
universities which have radiological-health programs are generally available to state
agencies for consultation; and although, according to Dr. Whipple, state agencies
traditionally prefer full-time staffs to part-time consultants, the greater cost of a fulltime staff would tend to limit the demand for full-time employees. Another factor
which indicates that sufficient numbers of adequately trained personnel would be
available is that the supply of persons trained in radiological health expands with
each class that graduates from the radiological-health programs now established in
colleges and universities. Some of those graduates work for state health departments;
others are employed by the AEC; and still others are hired by the public-utility companies. In addition, Dr. Whipple noted that some graduates are forming consulting
firms-a practice which he expects will expand with the growth of the nuclear industry. Dr. Whipple conceded that an acute shortage would be created if all states
made the necessary appropriations and attempted to hire trained personnel within
a short time, but he suggested that this would be unlikely. Interview with Dr. G.
Hoyt Whipple, Professor of Radiological Health, School of Public Health, University
of Michigan, in Ann Arbor, Michigan, April 13, 1970.
SO. See Helman1 supra note ?61 a~ 63-6¾,
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by those whom they regulate is well-known,81 and that consideration
alone should prompt a cautious approach in an area as delicate as
that involving atomic energy. Indeed, there is some indication that
the AEC has become identified with the industry which it is regulating and that the Commission does more promoting than regulating.
Practice under the licensing program reveals that the determinations
to issue permits are sometimes made, prior to public hearings, in
nonpublic meetings between the AEC regulatory staff and the applicant. 82 The burden is on the intervenor to prove that the provisions of the application are inadequate to protect the public safety.83
The primary functions of the AEC's counsel in public hearings are
to demonstrate that the radioactive discharges are within the minimum levels required by the regulatory staff and to publicize safety
measures provided in the reactor design-or, as one commentator
has stated, "to help the applicant get a construction permit." 84
Moreover, the industry's objection to state regulation seems to
presume that the state regulators will be incompetent and parochial
-a presumption that may not be warranted. It may be expected that
in a state licensing proceeding the applicant will at least have an opportunity to present evidence to demonstrate to the state agency
that the agency's standards or regulations are unreasonable in light
of their consequences on related aspects of operating a nuclear
power plant. Thus, the state regulators' attention will be focused
on the precise difficulties which the state standards create for the
power company; and the state agency will be able to evaluate the
reasonableness of its standards in view of those consequences. Moreover, there will be available to the industry a degree of judicial
protection, particularly if the decisions of the state administrative
body run counter to the federal regulations. In any event, it seems a
bit early to dismiss the possibility of adequate state regulation; one
must posit at least a modicum of confidence in the capacity of state
agencies to render reasonable decisions.
Another objection to state regulation may be drawn from the
nature of air pollution. It may be contended that because air pollution from atomic facilities is an interstate problem, national regulation is necessary. That objection is persuasive, however, only to
the extent that pollution from one state may harm inhabitants of
another state. Certainly, federal regulation is necessary to ensure
that lax standards of one state do not result in harm to persons in
another state. But when one state seeks to set pollution control
standards which are more strict than those of a neighboring state or
81. L.

JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION

82. See Green, supra note 66, at 651.
83. Id. at 654.
84. Id. at 656.

11-14 (1965).
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the federal government, no harm to persons in the neighboring state
can result, and hence there is no need for pre-emption by federal
regulation. This reasoning applies to radioactive air pollution, for
strict state standards in fact serve to protect inhabitants of neighboring states; and, in any event, so long as state standards may not be
more lax than the federal standards, any pollution reaching adjoining states will not exceed that permitted by the federal standards.
Another important policy consideration is the need for economical electrical power. Admittedly, the addition of state licensing systems would create an additional expense in an already costly process.85 In addition, the AEC argues that it is in the best position to
strike the balance between public safety and the economical development of nuclear power, since a state agency, concerned only with
safety considerations, may not give adequate attention to the need
to take tolerable risks in order to further the development of peaceful uses of atomic energy. 86 That argument, however, should be
examined with some skepticism in view of the allegations that the
AEC may have become a "captured" agency. 87 In any event, the argument that allowing state regulation will increase the cost of electrical power generated by nuclear energy is persuasive only up to a
point. In the first place, it is not clear that the implementation of
the state standards would retard the development of atomic power
production or significantly increase the cost of electrical power. Indeed, it might be argued that imposition of strict standards can
serve to encourage increased technological development in order to
produce electrical power more efficiently. Moreover, since utility
rates are in part based on a fixed rate of return on investment,88
capital expenditures necessitated by pollution control regulations
could be spread among a large consumer population and thus
neither directly impede technological advance nor substantially increase the cost of electrical power. In the Minnesota situation, for
example, the state pollution control agency determined that the increased costs necessitated by its regulation of radioactive discharges
from the utility's nuclear power plant would not increase the price
of electricity beyond a level which consumers would be willing to
85. See generally Cavers, State Responsibility in the Regulation of Atomic Reactors,
50 KY. L. REv. 29, 34-36 (1959).
86. Green, supra note 66, at 649.
87. See text accompanying notes 80-84 supra.
88. A fair rate of return is the generally accepted measure of reasonable rate levels

for privately owned public utilities who enjoy monopoly status. The role of return
allowed is a multiple of two factors: the rate base and the fair rate of return. The
rate base is the total amount of invested capital on which the utility is permitted in
reasonable rate of compensation. The fair rate of return is a percentage rate deemed
appropriate in light of historical conditions and considerations prevailing or anticipated at the time of the rate case. J. 130NBRIGHT, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC UTILITY RATES
147-51 (1961). See also FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591 (1944).
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pay,89 presumably because the cost would be spread among all consumers so that none would feel a substantial burden individually.90
It may be argued that a national agency is the appropriate authority to regulate atomic pollution, because the increased costs of
production required by local regulation of radioactive pollutants
will affect consumer prices beyond local markets. This objection,
however, is not unique to atomic pollutants, but is equally applicable
to all forms of air pollution. Yet, despite the fact that local control
of pollution may affect consumer prices outside the regulating state,
Congress, when it enacted the Air Quality Control Act of 1967,91
emphasized local control of air pollution. It thus appears that the
economic effects of state regulation in this area are not sufficient to
preclude state regulation.
Moreover, it can be contended that the economics of production
should not be accorded great weight in determining the propriety of
state efforts toward pollution control, for as many environmentalists
have pointed out, the economics of production are in fact the fundamental cause of the general deterioration of the environment.92 Because past generations sacrificed the environment in their pursuit of
economic and technological development, this generation faces an
environmental crisis of staggering proportions. In view of that crisis,
the public today is becoming increasingly aware of the value of the
environment and thus may now be willing to pay to preserve that
environment.
The foregoing policy considerations suggest that arguments
against permitting some state regulation in this area are not necessarily compelling. Indeed, there are a number of policy considerations which favor a degree of state regulation. For example, the
indications that the AEC may tend to favor promotion over protection93 suggest that some state regulation or participation could serve
89. Kenworthy, Who Will Police the Polluters?, N.Y. Times, Feb. 1, 1970, § E, at 2,
col. 3.
90. The impact that the increased cost of electricity would have on individual
consumers of electricity might be further minimized because a substantial portion
of the electricity produced would be purchased by industries which might socialize
that increased cost among the consumers of their products.
91. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857-571 (Supp. IV, 1965-1968).
92. 1969 Hearings 297 (testimony of Mr. Carl Klein, Asst. Secretary for Water
Quality Research, U.S. Dept. of the Interior):
Clearly, we must not cast the question of balanced use of the environment in
solely economic terms.
Under these conditions, the use of the environment is taken at zero and, inevitably, we wind up sacrificing the environment for the benefit of development
and resource expenditures.
Alternative balances, such as those of competing uses in view of society's longrange goals, must be considered. Man has existed some 2 million years on the
basis of his use of the environment without reckoning the true cost of that use.
Our future depends on a more reasonable assessment of its value.
93. See text accompanying notes 80-84 supra.

1312

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 68

to promote balance in the decision-making process. In addition,
strong state interests are present in this area. Local commumt1es
bear the risk of having a nuclear power plant in their midst and
hence have a very real interest in the level of radioactive discharges
at which atomic power plants are permitted to operate. Yet under
the present regulatory scheme, state authorities have no power to
regulate the potential hazards from radioactive pollution of the air
and have little effective opportunity to participate in the decisionmaking process. The best solution seems to be to permit states such
as Minnesota, which seek an additional margin of safety, to play a
more active role in accommodating the need for electrical power
with the need to preserve the environment.
The goal could be achieved in either of two ways. One approach
is through state regulation under existing law-the method sought
by Minnesota in its current dispute. Success in this approach depends upon a judicial finding that some state regulation of radioactive air pollution has not been pre-empted by Congress. Although
the statutory framework and its legislative history do not clearly
preclude a sympathetic court from upholding the state regulation in
this instance, the probable outcome admittedly must favor preemption. In any event, there are limits to what could be accomplished through this approach. Certainly, a judicial decision
permitting a degree of state regulation could have the effect of
counterbalancing some of the shortcomings of the current AEC
procedure. Yet many of the objections to state regulation have some
validity, and permitting state efforts in this field raises the problem
of unnecessary and wasteful duplication of administration. For that
reason, it seems that a long-range solution would better be sought
through congressional alteration of the statutory framework.
The conditions upon which Congress predicated the present regulatory scheme when it amended the Atomic Energy Act in 1959
need to be re-evaluated in light of the changes which have occurred
in those conditions during the past ten years. The two most important of these changes are the willingness on the part of state governments to assume greater responsibility in controlling environmental
pollution and the increased number of trained personnel who are
available to aid the states in their efforts to control radioactive air
pollution. In addition, although the development of nuclear power
to satisfy the nation's expanding needs for electrical energy continues to be an important national interest, that interest must now
be harmonized with a correspondingly important need to preserve
the environment. Thus, it is not possible to say that either the
national interest in promoting nuclear development or the local
interest in health and safety predominates; on the contrary, each is
intertwined with the other. Hence, what is needed is a coordinated
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regulatory scheme in which states could have a greater opportunity
for participation than they presently have.
Such a regulatory scheme might be modeled upon that which
Congress has adopted in the Air Quality Control Act of 1967 .94
Under that Act, the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
(HEW) develops air quality control criteria for the various atmospheric regions into which the nation is divided. 95 The states then
promulgate air quality standards and enforcement measures which
are evaluated by HEW to determine whether or not they are consistent with the federal criteria. I£ the state standards are inadequate
to protect the public health and safety, or if they are inconsistent
with the federal standards, HEW may establish air quality control
standards on its own initiative. The act specifically provides that the
states may enact more exacting standards than the HEW criteria
require.96 That regulatory scheme is predicated upon a congressional
finding that the prevention and control of air pollution at its source
is essentially a state responsibility; 97 and the scheme provides a
flexible approach for meeting the problem of such pollution and
encourages local innovation and experimentation in developing control techniques.98
Arguably, a similar approach could be utilized to control radioactive air pollutants discharged from nuclear reactors. Those states
which prefer to allocate their financial resources to the control of'
other air pollutants and those states which are satisfied with the protection afforded by the AEC's standards could rely upon the AEC to
provide minimum protection from radioactive air pollution. But
those states wishing to provide an additional margin of safety would
be free to do so by enacting safety standards more stringent than
94. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857-57(1) (Supp. IV, 1965-1968).
95. Atmospheric regions are air basins determined on the basis of meteorological
studies, and may stretch across several states. 42 U.S.C. § 1857(d)(l} (Supp. IV, 19651968).
96. It is possible to draw an inference of congressional intent to pre-empt state
regulation of radiation hazards from the absence of a savings clause similar to this
provision in the Air Quality Control Act. But the significance of the presence or
absence of a savings clause depends upon the theory which one entertains with respect
to federal pre-emption. One could argue that the supremacy clause of the Constitution creates a presumption of federal pre-emption and that consequently a savings
clause would be necessary to negate this pre-emption. On the other hand, it can be
argued that when the legislation deals with an area-such as that involving health
and safety-in which the paramount policy appears to be the preservation of local
authority, a savings clause is unnecessary to prevent pre-emption. More realistically,
the presence or absence of a savings clause should not be determinative of the preemption issue; rather the court should decide the matter in terms of the policies
embodied within the legislature. See generally Note, Pre-emption as a Preferential
Ground: A New Canon of Construction, 12 STAN. L. REv. 208, 211-14 (1959).
97. 42 U.S.C. § 1857(a}(3) (Supp. IV, 1965-1968).
98. See generally Martin & Symington, A Guide to the Air Quality Control Act of
1967, 33 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROB. 239 (1968).
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those of the AEC. Under this approach, minimum protection for
the entire country would still be provided by the AEC, yet the increased role of state regulation and participation would provide a
valuable safeguard against the possibility that the federal agency
may be more interested in promotion than in regulation. Costs,
whether in the form of increased product costs or of deterioration
of the environment are incurred regardless of the approach taken;
but the views of those persons who inevitably bear the burden of
those costs deserve greater consideration than that which is now
afforded to them in the present AEC regulatory scheme.

